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THE GULF OF MAINE BOUNDARY DISPUTE AND 
TRANSBOUNDARY MANAGEMENT 
CHALLENGES: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED* 
David L. VanderZwaag** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One might be cynical about the usefulness of trying to draw legal 
guidance from a judicial determination of a United States-Canada dispute 
admitted by the judges themselves to be geographically unique.  As 
stated by the majority of the judges in the Case Concerning Delimitation 
of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Gulf of Maine 
Case) decision: 
Although the practice is still rather sparse, owing to the relative 
newness of the question, it too is there to demonstrate that each 
specific case is, in the final analysis, different from all the others, 
that it is monotypic and that, more often than not, the most 
appropriate criteria, and the method or combination of methods 
most likely to yield a result consonant with what the law 
indicates, can only be determined in relation to each particular 
case and its specific characteristics.1 
                                            
 * This paper is substantially drawn from David VanderZwaag, The Gulf of Maine 
Boundary Dispute and Transboundary Management Challenges: Lessons for the 
Aegean? in THE AEGEAN SEA AFTER THE COLD WAR: SECURITY AND LAW 
OF THE SEA ISSUES 118-133 (Aldo Chircop, A. Gerolymatos & J.O. Iatrides eds., 
New York: St. Martins’ Press 2000) (reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan) 
and a subsequent presentation at the 2008 International Conference on Boundary 
Delimitation in Taipei on June 19, 2008.  The author would like to acknowledge the 
support of the Center for Marine Policy Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University in 
updating the original publication. 
 ** Director, Marine & Environmental Law Institute, Dalhousie University and 
Canada Research Chair in Ocean Law and Governance. 
 1. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 
1984 I.C.J. 246, 290 (Oct. 12) [hereinafter Gulf of Maine Judgment]. 
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However, this Article, after providing a brief historical overview of 
the Gulf of Maine dispute, suggests six general lessons to be extracted 
from the Gulf of Maine Case.  Those lessons include: the utility of 
binding dispute resolution and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
Chamber procedure; the flexibility in establishing the parameters for 
binding dispute resolution; the possible linkability of a binding dispute 
resolution agreement with other marine management and entitlement 
issues; the possible variability of maritime boundary claims over time; 
the divisibility of the line drawing task; and the advisability of pursuing 
the binding dispute resolution alternative.  
Two additional lessons have emerged in the wake of the case.  First 
is the continuity of transboundary ocean and coastal governance 
challenges, even after an ocean boundary is drawn.  Second is the 
evolutionary nature of maritime boundary methodology where 
subsequent cases have further clarified the rather murky delimitation 
approach set out in the Gulf of Maine Case. 
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE GULF OF MAINE DISPUTE 
Surrounded by the states of Maine, New Hampshire, and 
Massachusetts, and the Canadian provinces of New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia, the Gulf of Maine, located off the northeast coast of the United 
States, began to become an offshore “turf battle” in the 1960s and early 
1970s because of varying continental shelf claims.  In 1964 Canada 
issued oil and gas exploration permits on Georges Bank,2 the thumb-
shaped underwater plateau rich in fisheries resources.3  Relying on the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,4 Canada considered 
the equidistant line as the proper ocean boundary.5  While the United 
States also began to issue geophysical exploration permits on Georges 
Bank in 1964,6 the United States did not formally protest the Canadian 
                                            
 2. Id. at 279. 
 3. For a review of abundance of market and non-market species on Georges Bank, 
see Edward B. Cohen & Richard W. Langton, The Ecological Consequences of Fishing 
in the Gulf of Maine, in THE GULF OF MAINE, NOAA COASTAL OCEAN PROGRAM 
REGIONAL SYNTHESIS SERIES 45, 58-60 (David W. Townsend and Peter F. Larsen eds., 
Washington, DC: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 1992). 
 4. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 
311. 
 5. Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 279. 
 6. Memorial submitted by the United States of America in Case Concerning 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area 58 (Sept. 27, 1982). 
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claim until November 1969,7 when the United States requested a 
moratorium until the exact continental shelf boundary could be agreed 
upon.  On December 1, 1969, Canada refused to accept a moratorium,8 
and during subsequent negotiations in 1970, the United States first made 
its boundary position clear.  All of Georges Bank was claimed, with the 
deep Northeast Channel, off the tip of the Bank, viewed as a natural 
dividing line.9 
A “fish feud” emerged in light of the adoption of 200 nautical mile 
fishing zones in 1977 by both the United States and Canada.10  With 
Canada’s fisheries zone becoming effective on January 1, 1977, and the 
United States’ fisheries zone coming into force on March 1, 1977, over-
lapping fisheries zones occurred.11  Canada at first claimed an equidistant 
line, but on November 3, 1977 it enlarged its claim.  The claim changed 
due to the special circumstances of Cape Cod, Nantucket Island, and 
Martha’s Vineyard, which, Canada argued, should not be considered part 
of the United States coastline due to their distorting effect.12  The United 
States claimed all the fisheries of Georges Bank.13 Through interim 
arrangements, the countries agreed to allow fishing to continue by 
nationals of both sides in the disputed areas subject to flag state 
enforcement and in accord with pre-existing fishing patterns and 
efforts.14 
Following negotiations in 1977-1978, the feud appeared to be nearly 
over in March 1979.  A package of two linked treaties, one attempting to 
ensure a permanent fisheries access and management regime in the 
transboundary region, regardless of the eventual boundary line,15 and a 
second agreeing to send the dispute to binding resolution by a Chamber 
                                            
 7. Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 280-81. 
 8. Id. at 281. 
 9. Id. 
 10. For a review of the history see David L. VanderZwaag, THE FISH FEUD: THE US 
AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE (Lexington: Lexington Books 1983). 
 11. Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 282-83. 
 12. Id. at 284. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement Between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Canada, U.S-Can., Feb. 24, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5571; Gulf 
of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 283. 
 15. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
United States of America on East Coast Fishery Resources, U.S.-Can., March 29, 1979, 
reprinted in Annexes to the Memorial submitted by Canada, Vol. 1, Annex 20, 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.) (Sept. 
1982) [hereinafter East Coast Fishery Resources Agreement]. 
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of the International Court of Justice,16 were concluded on March 29, 
1979. 
Because of substantial opposition from U.S. fishing interests and 
industry representatives to the 1979 East Coast Fisheries Agreement,17 
only a delinked boundary settlement treaty was ratified by the United 
States.  Canada and the United States exchanged instruments of 
ratification of the amended boundary settlement treaty on November 20, 
1981 and notification to the International Court of Justice of a reference 
was given on November 25, 1981.18 
On October 12, 1984 a Chamber of the International Court of Justice 
drew a single maritime boundary for the Gulf of Maine/Georges Bank 
region.  Canada received jurisdiction over approximately one-sixth of 
Georges Bank,19 and some commentators have described the decision as 
essentially “splitting the difference” between the Canadian and United 
States’ claims.20 
III. SIX LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE CASE 
A. The Utility of Binding Third-Party Resolutions and the ICJ Chamber 
Procedure 
While a negotiated settlement of an ocean boundary dispute is gener-
ally preferable to international litigation for cost, creativity, and control 
reasons, the United States-Canada Gulf of Maine dispute shows the 
useful “final say” function of third-party binding dispute resolution.  
After over a decade of negotiations, the two states were still unable to 
resolve the maritime boundary and management disputes through 
negotiation, and politicians, bureaucrats, and lawyers found themselves 
stalemated.21  With so many socioeconomic interests at stake, including 
those of the United States fishing industry, who saw Georges Bank as 
“belonging to America,”22 both countries saw the need for an 
                                            
 16. The Agreement is reproduced in Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 252-55. 
 17. For a review of some of the grounds for opposition, including a belief that the 
scallop allotment was inequitable to the United States, see VanderZwaag, supra note 10, 
at 90-92. 
 18. Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 287. 
 19. Jan Schneider, The Gulf of Maine Case: The Nature of an Equitable Result, 79 
AM. J. INT’L L. 539 (1985). 
 20. Id. at 541. 
 21. See Lewis Alexander, The Gulf of Maine Case: An International Discussion, 21 
STUD. TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 71 (1988) (statement of Davis Robinson). 
 22. VanderZwaag, supra note 10, at 91-92. 
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authoritative decision by a prestigious institution to which local 
constituencies would listen.23  Conciliation was viewed as unworkable 
because general words of guidance would likely not be accepted by 
vested interest groups.24 
The Gulf of Maine dispute also highlights the possible attractiveness 
of sending a boundary dispute to a Chamber of the ICJ rather than to the 
full 15-member Court or to an independent ad hoc arbitral tribunal.25  
Through the Chamber procedure, both countries were able to select five 
judges26 with experience in the area and who posed no major political 
sensitivities.27  The Chamber was chosen over an international arbitration 
because the parties saw numerous benefits of an established institution 
where judges’ salaries, courtrooms, registry, translation, interpretation, 
and reproduction were independently provided and funded.28  
B. Flexibility in Establishing the Parameters for Binding Dispute 
Resolution 
The Gulf of Maine Case shows that parties choosing to go to binding 
dispute settlement have considerable flexibility in directing what is to be 
settled and how.  Parties have leeway in requesting partial versus full set-
tlement of boundary disputes, asking a tribunal to actually draw a 
boundary line versus declaring general legal guidance, and opting for a 
single line versus multiple lines. 
1. Partial vs. Full Settlement 
The Gulf of Maine dispute demonstrates how parties may withhold 
some parts of a boundary conflict from binding resolution in favor of 
pursuing direct negotiation or further settlement at a later date.  Canada 
                                            
 23. See Alexander, supra note 21, at 16-17 (statement of Leonard LeGault). 
 24. Id. at 20. 
 25. For a good discussion of the perceived benefits, see Davis R. Robinson, David A. 
Colson & Bruce C. Rashkaw, Some Perspectives on Adjudicating before the World 
Court: The Gulf of Maine Case, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 578, 581-82 (1985). 
 26. The judges appointed by the Court as requested by the parties included:  Roberto 
Ago (Italy), Herman Mosler (Federal Republic of Germany), Andre Gros (France), 
Stephen Schwebel (United States), and Maxwell Cohen as judge ad hoc (Canada).  Id. at 
582. 
 27. For example, a United States’ representative expressed concern over how the U.S. 
systems would have reacted if a Soviet judge had some bearing on determining the fate of 
New England fisherpersons.  See Alexander, supra note 21 at 17-18 (statement of David 
Colson). 
 28. Robinson et al., supra note 25, at 581. 
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and the United States reserved from judicial delimitation a section of 
approximately thirty-nine miles, the boundary area nearest the coasts.29 
Because of sovereignty disputes over Machias Seal Island and North 
Rock,30 the parties chose to ask the Court to begin its delineation exercise 
at the agreed point seaward of the disputed lands.31  The parties also did 
not wish to have the Court determine a boundary line out to the edge of 
the continental margin, and therefore restricted it to terminating the 
boundary in a triangle drawn seaward of Georges Bank32 (see Fig. 1).  In 
the Special Agreement to resort to adjudication before a Chamber of the 
World Court, the parties agreed that after the decision, either party could 
request negotiations on a seaward extension of the maritime boundary.  If 
no agreement was forthcoming, either party could require binding third-
party settlement.33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 29. Id. at 584-85. 
 30. For a further review of the dispute, see Sue Nichols, The Gulf of Maine Boundary: 
Reviewing the Issues, 4-6, Occasional Paper No. 12 (Fredericton: Cadastral Studies, 
1982); Beverly Cook, Lobster Boat Diplomacy: the Canada-US Grey Zone 29 MARINE 
POLICY 385, 385-90; Ted L. McDorman & David L. VanderZwaag, American-Canadian 
Boundary Dispute, and Cooperation, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Max Planck Institute for comparative public law and international 
law: heidelberg and oxford university press 2010), available at http://www.mpepil.com. 
 31. Termed point A, the location is the first point of intersection of the two lines 
representing the limits of the fishing zones respectively claimed by Canada and the 
United States.  Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. 
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 265 (Oct. 12). 
 32. Id. at 266. 
 33. Article VII of the Special Agreement of 29 March 1979.  The Agreement is 
reprinted in the Gulf of Maine Judgment.  Id. at 252-55. 
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Figure 1: general map of the Gulf of Maine region, showing the 
starting-point for the delimitation line and the area for its 
termination.34 
2. Actual Line vs. General Guidance 
The Gulf of Maine Case emphasizes the choice parties have to ask a 
tribunal to actually draw a boundary line or to simply declare relevant 
principles, rules, and methods for future demarcation guidance.  While in 
the two previous cases before the ICJ involving maritime boundary 
delimitations parties had requested only judicial guidance,35 Canada and 
the United States asked the Chamber to draw a delimitation line itself.36 
                                            
 34. Id. at 269. 
 35. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den./F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 
(Feb. 20); Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Jan. 20). 
 36. Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 267. 
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The Gulf of Maine Case portrays the difficult trade-off which states 
may face in making the choice between actual line and general guidance.  
States wishing to retain control over negotiating a final boundary 
alignment by requesting merely a “declaratory” judgment may risk 
further dispute in the subsequent demarcation negotiations.37  Because 
Canada and the United States wished to resolve the boundary issue “once 
and for all,” and to avoid further negotiations, they chose to request an 
actual delimitation.38 
3. Single Line vs. Multiple Lines 
The Gulf of Maine Case also demonstrates the flexibility countries 
encounter in whether to request a tribunal to delimit a single maritime 
boundary or to allow judicial discretion for the drawing of separate 
continental shelf and water column lines.  The case also shows why most 
countries would probably prefer a single boundary.  Canada and the 
United States asked the ICJ Chamber to draw a single maritime 
boundary, as the parties wished to avoid the potential “managerial 
nightmare” resulting from separate fisheries and seabed lines.  For 
example, if Canada were granted seabed jurisdiction but no fisheries 
jurisdiction over Georges Bank, it might be tempted to proceed with 
hydrocarbon exploration without concern for U.S. fishing interests.39 
While the Chamber accepted the legal feasibility of drawing a single 
line,40 it also noted the legal implications of a single-line request.  A 
single-line delimitation was viewed as forcing a tribunal to give 
preference to “neutral” geographical criteria, such as equal division of 
areas off converging and overlapping coastal projections, length of 
coastlines, and the effect of offshore islands.41  Criteria for division 
exclusively based on only one of the natural realities to be delimited, 
such as natural separation of ecosystems or a distinct geological feature 
on the continental shelf, are ruled out.42 
                                            
 37. Interestingly, in the Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between 
Greenland and Jan Mayen, where Denmark desired a delimitation line while Norway 
wished to have a declaration, the ICJ proceeded to draw a line in order to completely 
“discharge [ ] its duty to determine the dispute.” Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation 
in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den, v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 78 (June 
14). 
 38. Alexander, supra note 21, at 20 (statement of David Colson). 
 39. Id. at 27-28. 
 40. Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 267. 
 41. Id. at 327-28. 
 42. Id. at 326-27. 
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While the United States argued that the Northeast Channel, 
sometimes over 200 meters deep, represented a natural boundary,43 the 
Court rejected the argument on two main grounds.  First, the seabed itself 
did not show major geological divisions.44  For example, sand, mud, 
gravel, and underlying hydrocarbon deposits ran across from the 
Canadian Scotian Shelf to Georges Bank.45  Second, the 
“geomorphological accident” of the Northeast Channel did not divide the 
marine resources and ecosystems of the adjacent water column.46 
The Gulf of Maine Case thus suggests a practical question for coun-
tries pondering third party boundary adjudication in the future.  Is the 
possible wider scope for arguing ecological and geological criteria in a 
multiple-line request worth the ocean management complexities which 
would be likely to accompany a plurality of lines? 
C. Linkability of a Binding Dispute Resolution 
The Gulf of Maine Case also highlights the possibility for parties 
engaged in a maritime boundary dispute to make an agreement to litigate 
conditional on the settlement of at least some closely linked issues.  
Canada and the United States at first agreed to link the Treaty to Submit 
to Binding Dispute Resolution with the Agreement on East Coast Fishery 
Resources, where both would have to be ratified before either came into 
effect.47 The East Coast Fisheries Agreement48 (the Agreement) promised 
to establish a joint fisheries management commission and to ensure 
fisheries access to both countries for certain fish stocks, regardless of 
where a boundary might eventually be drawn.  The Agreement also 
provided an “insurance policy” to Canada in particular, which faced the 
possibility of losing all of Georges Bank through judicial recourse.49  
When political opposition in the United States to the Fisheries 
Agreement made acceptance impossible, Canada only agreed to ratify the 
Boundary Settlement Treaty upon assurances that the United States 
would refrain from enforcement activities against Canadian fishing 
                                            
 43. Id. at 276. 
 44. Id. at 275. 
 45. See Gulf of Maine Case, Annexes to the Canadian Memorial Submitted by 
Canada, Vol. I, 1-22. 
 46. Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 277. 
 47. Id. at 287. 
 48. East Coast Fishery Resources Agreement, supra note 15. 
 49. For reviews of the complex and detailed fishery management arrangements 
negotiated, see VanderZwaag, supra note 10; Memorial submitted by Canada in the Gulf 
of Maine case (Sept. 1982), 111-14. 
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vessels in all areas claimed by Canada pending the conclusion of 
adjudication.50 
D. Variability of Maritime Boundary Claims Over Time 
The Gulf of Maine Case also shows how national claims can vary 
during negotiations and even within adjudication.  While Canada at first 
claimed an equidistant line on Georges Bank in 1977, amid negotiations 
to resolve the dispute, Canada expanded its claims through an argument 
of “equitable equidistance” whereby Cape Cod would be disregarded in 
determining the equidistant line and an additional 2900 square miles 
would be gained.51  While the United States initially claimed a line 
through the Northeast Channel generally following the deepest water, the 
United States added to the claim in 1982 at the memorial stage before the 
Court.  An adjusted perpendicular line to the general direction of the 
coast of Maine was argued52 (see Figure 2).  The United States, in 
shifting the line to within some twenty-five nautical miles of Yarmouth, 
Nova Scotia, was trying to take a position of maximum legal advantage.53 
                                            
 50. Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 287. 
 51. Robinson et al., supra note 25, at 591. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Alexander, supra note 21, at 47 (statement by Davis Robinson). 
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Figure 2:  Claims of the Parties in the Gulf of Maine Case.54 
                                            
 54. Reproduced from Jan Schneider, The Gulf of Maine Case: The Nature of an 
Equitable Result, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 539, 547 (1985). 
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E. The Divisibility of the Line-drawing Task 
The Gulf of Maine Case highlights a “division by segments” 
approach to boundary-making which is likely to be common given the 
varying geographical circumstances arising in many boundary conflicts.  
The Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case chose to draw a boundary line in 
three segments to reflect the changing geographical relationships 
between the United States and Canada as one moves seaward from the 
delimitation starting point chosen by the parties.  The first segment 
reflected the lateral adjacency relationship of the countries at the back of 
the Gulf.55  The second segment, reflecting the oppositeness of coast-
lines, was a median line corrected to account for the longer American 
coastline (284 miles to 206 miles or a 1.38 to 1 ratio), and to give half 
effect to the presence of Seal Island and a smaller island (Mud Island) 
located some thirteen miles off the mainland of Nova Scotia.56  The third 
segment was drawn into the open ocean as a perpendicular line to the 
closing line of the Gulf with a termination at the last point of overlap 
between the parties’ 200 nautical-mile fishing zone claims.57 (see Figure 
3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 55. Donat Pharand, Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries: Continental Shelf and 
Exclusive Economic Zone, in Light of the Gulf of Maine Case, Canada v. United States 
(1984), 16 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT 363, 381 (1985). 
 56. Id. at 381-82. 
 57. Id. at 382. 
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Figure 3:  Delimitation Line Drawn by the Court.58 
                                            
 58. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, (Can. v. U.S.), 
1984 I.C.J. 246, 346 (Oct. 12). 
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F. The Advisability of Pursuing the Binding Dispute Resolution 
Alternative 
The Gulf of Maine Case stands as a caution to countries considering 
binding dispute resolution as the legal “reductionism” likely to be faced.  
While the Gulf of Maine dispute was primarily about fisheries access and 
historical fisheries dependencies, the Court downplayed examination of 
socioeconomic and historical factors.  The Court put on “blinders” and 
reduced criteria for application to the delimitation process itself to 
geographical ones. The main criterion is equal division of areas where 
the maritime projections of the coasts of the states converge and 
overlap.59  Auxiliary criteria, applied as corrective measures, are giving 
effect to the difference between the lengths of the respective coastlines 
(proportionality) and to the presence of islands.60  While not eligible to 
be used as official criteria in the delimitation process, human and 
economic geography may be relevant to help ascertain whether an 
equitable result was achieved.61  Socioeconomic aspects would only be 
given weight in case of radical inequitability involving “catastrophic 
repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the 
population of the countries concerned.”62 
The Gulf of Maine Case also raises the question of whether parties 
should be willing to risk litigation when even the concept of “neutral 
geography” is laden with subjectivity and discretion.  An example of the 
wide scope for geographical interpretation was shown by differing judi-
cial views in the case over relevant Bay of Fundy coastal lengths in cal-
culating proportionality.  While the majority was willing to include 
coasts up to the point where the Bay narrows to contain “only maritime 
areas lying no further than 12 miles from the low water mark,”63 Judge 
Schwebel in a separate opinion would only include the New Brunswick 
coast actually fronting on the Gulf of Maine, and the length of a closing 
line running across the Bay to Nova Scotia.64  Judge Schwebel noted that 
it “is to be expected that differences of judgment on the application of 
equitable principles will arise which at times may not admit of confident 
conclusions of law.”65 
                                            
 59. Id. at 327. 
 60. Id. at 327-28.  See also Pharand, supra note 55, at 380. 
 61. Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 340. 
 62. Id. at 342. 
 63. Id. at 335-36. 
 64. Id. at 355 (Schwebel, J., separate opinion). 
 65. Id. at 357. 
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Judge Gros, in dissent, lamented over the lack of legal certainty rep-
resented by the use of equitable principles to reach an equitable result 
approach to boundary delimitation: 
It is, in short, a law unto itself, where each case is exposed to the 
application of any imaginable criteria, methods and corrections 
conducive to a result which the disappearance of rules leaves to 
the discretion of each tribunal.66 
In light of the vagaries of adjudication, various commentators have 
questioned the advisability of binding dispute resolution.  The model of 
the Torres Strait Agreement between Australia and Papua New Guinea67 
has been invoked as exemplifying the more creative solutions available 
through direct negotiations.68  There the parties were able to deal 
creatively with a complicated political geography involving Australian 
islands near the coast of Papua New Guinea through various innovations.  
The innovations included restricting the Australian islands to three-mile 
territorial seas; using multiple boundary lines with Australia receiving a 
fisheries zone extending seaward from the Australian islands near the 
PNG coast, while Papua New Guinea was granted rights to the seabed 
beneath the extended fisheries zone; and the establishment of a protected 
zone to protect traditional harvesting rights.69 
IV. TWO ADDITIONAL LESSONS EMERGING IN THE WAKE OF THE GULF 
OF MAINE CASE 
A. The Continuity of Transboundary Ocean and Coastal Governance 
Challenges 
The Gulf of Maine Case demonstrates that a maritime boundary 
delimitation is not an endpoint but a starting point for longer-term 
                                            
 66. Id. at 385 (Gros, J., dissenting). 
 67. The text is reprinted in Australia-Papua New Guinea: Treaty on Sovereignty and 
Maritime Boundaries in the Area Between the Countries, December 18, 1978, 18 I.L.M. 
291-331 (1979). 
 68. Jon M. Van Dyke, The Role of the Islands in Delimiting Maritime Zones: The 
Boundary Between Turkey and Greece, in THE AEGEAN ISSUES: PROBLEMS AND 
PROSPECTS 263 (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute 1989). 
 69. For overviews of the treaty provisions, see H. Burmester, The Torres Strait 
Treaty:  Ocean Boundary Delimitation by Agreement, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 321 (1982); 
STUART  KAYE, AUSTRALIA’S MARITIME BOUNDARIES 101 (Centre for Maritime Policy, 
University of Wollongong ed. 1995). 
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cooperation in managing the marine environment.70  Various issues 
beyond drawing lines at sea remain to be addressed, including: whether 
to grant foreign fishing access regardless of a line; allocation and 
management measures for transboundary fish stocks; surveillance and 
enforcement over illegal fishing; harmonization of standards for marine 
and coastal pollution; environmental impact assessment arrangements for 
proposed projects threatening to cause significant adverse transboundary 
impacts; safety of navigation; protecting habitats of threatened or 
endangered species; and promoting sustainable development in coastal 
communities. 
The Gulf of Maine Case provides an example of how even “good 
neighbours” with a “good fence” may still have many “miles to go” in 
meeting marine management challenges of a shared sea.  Nearly twenty 
five years after the ICJ Chamber drew a line across Georges Bank, 
Canada and the United States have yet to develop comprehensive 
transboundary management arrangements for the Georges Bank and Gulf 
of Maine region, and a fragmented array of cooperative arrangements, 
mostly informal, have evolved.71  In September 1990, Canada and the 
United States, concerned over the growing number of fishers illegally 
crossing the boundary line to fish, signed a reciprocal Fisheries 
Enforcement Agreement.72  The Agreement obliged each country to 
enact domestic prohibitions making it illegal for its nationals to violate 
the fisheries laws and regulations of the other state while within the 
jurisdiction of that country,73 and penalties for fishers illegally fishing 
across the maritime boundary have been harmonized.74 
Bilateral fisheries management has largely followed an informal 
path.  The Canada-USA Transboundary Steering Committee, established 
                                            
 70. See Ted L. McDorman, Phillip M. Saunders & David L. VanderZwaag, The Gulf 
of Maine Boundary: Dropping Anchor or Setting a Course?, 9 MARINE POLICY 90 
(1985). 
 71. See ACZISC SECRETARIAT AND MARINE & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE OF 
DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY, OVERVIEW OF CURRENT GOVERNANCE IN THE BAY OF 
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in 1995 and co-chaired by the Director-General for the Maritimes 
Region, Department of Fisheries and Oceans (Canada) and the Northeast 
Regional Administrator of the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service, 
serves as the overall consultative and oversight forum for discussing 
transboundary resource management issues.75  Under the auspices of the 
Steering Committee, the Transboundary Assessment Committee (TRAC) 
was established in 1998 to evaluate the status of three shared groundfish 
stocks on eastern Georges Bank (cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder) 
and to provide annual stock assessments.76  In 2000, the Transboundary 
Management Guidance Committee (TMGC) was formed to recommend 
harvest strategies and develop a resource sharing formula for the three 
transboundary groundfish stocks.77  The TMGC subsequently developed 
a Resource Sharing Formula which, taking effect in 2003, provided for a 
way to allocate annual quotas between the Canada and the United States 
for groundfish stocks.  The TMGC Sharing Formula allocates 
percentages of harvest based upon historical fisheries landings (for the 
period 1967-1994) and fisheries resource distribution with the two 
weightings shifting over a seven-year period.  The sharing formula 
initially assigned a weighting of 60% to resource distribution and 40% to 
historic landings for the year 2003, transitioning to a weighting of 90% 
for resource distribution and 10% for historical landings by 2010.78 
The Canada-USA Transboundary Steering Committee has been 
attempting to broaden its overall focus on transboundary fisheries to 
more of an ecosystem approach.  Working Groups on Species at Risk, 
Fish Habitat, and Oceans Management have been formed, and an 
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Integration Committee oversees and coordinates the activities occurring 
under the umbrella of the Canada-USA Steering Committee.79 
The Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment (the 
Council) was established in 1989 by the governors of Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, and Maine and the premiers of New Brunswick and 
Nova Scotia, as a forum for fostering cross-border discussions and 
collaborations.  The Council, involving representatives of state, 
provincial, and federal agencies as well as non-governmental 
organizations and the private sector, is administered through a 
Secretariat that rotates annually among the five Gulf jurisdictions.  The 
Council has set goals, outcomes and activities through five-year Action 
Plans with the most recent covering 2007-2012.80  Implementation of 
the Action Plan is facilitated through projects and initiatives developed 
under the auspices of five committees (Habitat, Contaminants, 
Maritime Activities, Ecosystem Indicator Partnership, and the Climate 
Change Network). 
To date cooperative activities have involved mostly talk and studies 
with little management action other than in the area of fisheries.  
Harmonization of environmental standards and the establishment of a 
regional network of marine protected areas remain challenges.81  
B. The Evolutionary Nature of Maritime Boundary Methodology 
In the Gulf of Maine Case, the Chamber highlighted the still rather 
nascent and unconsolidated nature of international law and practice 
relating to maritime boundary delimitation,82 and summarized the general 
and rather vague reality in terms of a “fundamental norm”: 
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(1) No maritime delimitation between States with opposite or 
adjacent coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those 
States.  Such delimitation must be sought and effected by 
means of an agreement, following negotiations conducted in 
good faith and with the genuine intention of achieving a 
positive result.  Where, however, such agreement cannot be 
achieved, delimitation should be effected by recourse to a 
third party possessing necessary competence. 
(2) In either case, delimitation is to be effected by the 
application of equitable criteria and by the use of practical 
methods capable of ensuring, with regard to the geographic 
configuration of the area and other relevant circumstances, 
an equitable result.83 
More recent international cases have crystallized a quite consistent 
methodology.  After identifying the relevant area, tribunals have first 
provisionally drawn an equidistant line and then considered whether 
there are relevant circumstances that require adjustment or shifting of the 
line in order to achieve an “equitable result.”84  Relevant circumstances, 
among others, may include coastal configurations, like concavity, 
presence of islands and relative length of coastlines.85 
V. CONCLUSION 
In many ways the Gulf of Maine Case speaks with a very general 
voice.  The Chamber of the International Court of Justice emphasized 
that only general criteria and an open-ended list of practical methods 
exist under present international law for guiding maritime boundary 
delimitation. 
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Although the specific circumstances of each boundary dispute make 
regional comparisons of limited use, the Gulf of Maine Case offers at 
least six basic lessons that may be learned.  Those lessons include: the 
potential utility of resorting to binding dispute resolution and the ICJ 
Chamber procedure; the flexibility open to countries in establishing the 
parameters for binding dispute resolution; the linkability of binding 
dispute resolution with other marine resource entitlement and 
management issues; the possible variability of maritime boundary claims 
over time; the divisibility of the line drawing task; and the advisability of 
pursuing the “legal reductionism” inherent in adjudication.  
Two additional lessons may also be learned in the wake of the case.  
First is the continuity of transboundary ocean and coastal governance 
challenges even after an ocean boundary is drawn.  Second is the 
evolutionary nature of maritime boundary delimitation methodology.  
The two-part methodology of first drawing a provisional equidistant line 
followed by possible adjustment in light of relevant circumstances 
should be viewed as a positive development.  The law is more 
predictable although considerable uncertainties still surround what are 
relevant criteria for deciding to shift the line.86  The learning process in 
relation to maritime boundary delimitation is an ongoing saga. 
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